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welve years ago, a friend from 
my breast cancer support 
group went to court because 
her insurance company had refused 
coverage for a bone marrow transplant. 
Her ﬁ  rst transplant had failed and her 
cancer was progressing again. The 
insurance company refused coverage 
for the second transplant on the basis 
that it was an experimental treatment. 
The judge, a cancer survivor himself, 
was clearly moved by her appeal, 
and my friend got her transplant. Six 
months later, she was dead—not from 
her metastatic breast cancer, but from 
treatment-induced damage to her bone 
marrow. 
Then, a second friend with breast 
cancer died following her transplant 
a few months after that, and I began 
to read the research for myself and to 
piece together what the studies actually 
showed—and what they didn’t show. 
My education about clinical trials had 
begun, as I have previously described in 
a 2003 essay entitled, “From Access to 
Evidence: An Advocate’s Journey” [1].
It took me some time, and a lot of 
study, to understand the dynamics of 
what had actually happened in America 
with bone marrow transplants in breast 
cancer. And how wishful thinking on 
the part of patients and oncologists, 
public pressure, heart-wrenching 
media stories of desperately ill young 
mothers, political and legislative 
mandates for insurance coverage, 
personal reputations of researchers, 
and proﬁ  t margins of hospitals with 
transplant beds to ﬁ  ll all managed to 
widely promote a toxic and expensive 
treatment before there was sufﬁ  cient 
evidence of its safety or efﬁ  cacy. 
The Rush to Embrace an Unproven 
Treatment
Hindsight being what it is, we can 
appreciate the dynamics now, and see 
how the uncritical adoption of this 
treatment off trial added years to the 
time that it took to enroll individuals 
in the randomized trials that ultimately 
would answer the question of efﬁ  cacy. 
By the end of the decade, in fact, 
more than 20,000 American women 
had endured this treatment for no 
compelling reason. Many died because 
of it, while others were left with serious 
and long-lasting side effects. 
Of course these women were very 
ill to begin with, and the prevailing 
wisdom of the time was that 
desperate circumstances called for 
desperate measures. Giving doses of 
chemotherapy so high that the bone 
marrow was destroyed, then rescuing 
the patient with her own stem cells 
or bone marrow—this treatment 
had intuitive drama and appeal. 
Many women at the time, including 
both of my friends mentioned in 
the introduction, vowed to “go out 
ﬁ  ghting,” rather than have the longer 
life and gentler death that might 
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The rush to embrace unproven treatments can end up harming patients 
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have been theirs with conventional 
treatment. “If I die,” young women 
would frequently say, “I want my 
children to know I did everything I 
could.” One transplant unit actually 
used this coercive argument as a 
marketing ploy.
Naively, I believed until then that 
doctors could be trusted to rely 
on good evidence, especially for a 
treatment as toxic and costly as this 
one. Certainly, they would never allow 
themselves to be misled by partial 
evidence or a compelling theory—that 
more is better, or that dramatic tumor 
response in uncontrolled Phase II trials 
of the high-dose regimens actually 
predicted for clinical beneﬁ  t. Or, even 
more shocking, that one existing small 
randomized trial that many questioned 
as ﬂ  awed—and which later, in fact, 
turned out to have been falsiﬁ  ed—
would be held up to patients as good 
evidence for the treatment [2–5]. 
Looking back now, I can trace my 
radicalization as a patient advocate, 
and my interest in the proper conduct 
of randomized clinical trials, to 
the troubling discovery that in the 
case of bone marrow transplant in 
patients with breast cancer, the tools 
of science had been subverted by 
the rush to embrace an unproven 
treatment. The fact that this could 
happen was profoundly disillusioning. 
I was disappointed with oncologists, 
but more disturbing to me was the 
role that many advocates had played 
in guaranteeing broad access to 
bone marrow transplants, effectively 
sabotaging enrollment in the 
randomized trials that would have 
provided a deﬁ  nitive answer years 
sooner, saving many lives and much 
personal suffering, not to mention 
huge ﬁ  nancial expenses. 
Three years ago, I recounted this 
story at the Annual Advocacy Training 
Conference of the National Breast 
Cancer Coalition. Since the bone 
marrow transplant stampede ended 
in 1999, many women diagnosed with 
breast cancer more recently were 
unaware of what had happened during 
the 1990s, and that the new mantra of 
“targeted therapy” had only recently 
replaced the “more is better” model. 
The transplant debacle also stiffened 
the resolve and long-time commitment 
to evidence-based medicine and 
research standards held by the National 
Breast Cancer Coalition (NBCC), a 
grassroots lobbying and advocacy-
training organization committed 
to the eradication of breast cancer. 
Standing alone among breast cancer 
organizations, NBCC had refused to 
ﬁ  ght for access to a treatment that was 
still unproven. Their position paper on 
bone marrow transplant was perceived 
by many as rigid and uncaring. Yet 
NBCC’s unwavering commitment to 
the evidence and to the need for trials 
prior to widespread adoption of the 
treatment ultimately won them the 
respect they deserved. 
What I Learned about Clinical Trials
Tragedies can sometimes be instructive. 
As an advocate, I learned a memorable 
lesson about how clinical trials can go 
terribly awry through the premature 
adoption of an unproven therapy. 
This extraordinarily painful example 
taught me—and many breast cancer 
advocates—a great deal about clinical 
trials: the limitations of Phase II studies, 
the crucial role of randomization and 
control groups, the perils of selection 
bias and stage migration, and surrogate 
endpoints, such as tumor response, that 
fail to predict clinical beneﬁ  t. I also 
learned how incredibly important it is 
to preserve the integrity of clinical trials 
for patients now and in the future. It is 
a matter of life and death. 
In the years since, the conduct of 
randomized clinical trials has often 
been in jeopardy. What prompted 
me to recount this dark chapter in 
our history to the NBCC advocates 
were the current legal activities of an 
organization known as the Abigail 
Alliance (http:⁄⁄abigail-alliance.org). 
Founded by surviving family members 
of patients with cancer who had been 
unable to get access to experimental 
treatments under development, with 
support by antiregulatory forces in 
Washington, D.C., Abigail Alliance ﬁ  rst 
brought a citizen’s petition and then a 
lawsuit against the United States Food 
and Drug Administration (FDA). They 
claimed that current restrictions on 
experimental treatments represented 
an infringement on the civil rights 
of dying patients. They proposed a 
regulation permitting the marketing 
of experimental treatments after Phase 
I trials to patients who had no other 
treatment alternatives, claiming that 
this would in no way interfere with the 
conduct of conﬁ  rmatory trials. 
They were ﬁ  rmly convinced that 
their loved ones could have been 
saved, if only they had been permitted 
access. To them—as to me a decade 
earlier, before I understood what 
was at stake—the beneﬁ  t from these 
cutting-edge treatments was obvious. 
The need was urgent. People they loved 
were dying. New treatments had been 
developed. How could anyone be cruel 
enough to deny a patient the next new 
treatment that might save or extend 
life? Randomized trials were seen as 
not only unnecessary but ethically 
indefensible. To them, the notion of 
equipoise was simply an absurdity. 
Strong perceptions of drug efﬁ  cacy, 
nurtured by pharmaceutical industry 
advertising, kept hope alive. 
At ﬁ  rst, the Abigail Alliance initiative 
to market drugs after Phase I trials 
seemed so absurd that many of us 
advocates didn’t take it seriously, and 
took no action. But the alliance was 
very serious and very determined. 
Publicized with the smiling face of their 
founder’s deceased daughter, Abigail, 
this group acquired considerable media 
attention, appearing on NBC’s Today 
Show and inspiring a Wall Street Journal 
editorial with the memorable title, 
“FDA to Patients: Drop Dead” [6].
Of course, the ﬁ  rst wave of activism 
for early access to treatments had come 
from AIDS advocates, giving rise to 
“accelerated approval,” or Subpart H 
regulations, in 1993, which permitted 
drugs to reach the market early in the 
case of life-threatening illnesses for 
which no other treatment existed (see 
http:⁄⁄www.accessdata.fda.gov/scripts/
cder/onctools/Accel.cfm). These 
approvals could be based on surrogate 
endpoints in uncontrolled trials, with 
the provision that clinical beneﬁ  t must 
be ultimately shown in post-marketing 
randomized, controlled studies. In the 
intervening years, many cancer drugs 
have been approved in this way. 
Meanwhile my own understanding 
of issues in clinical trials continued 
to evolve. Since my work focuses on 
women with metastatic breast cancer, 
my keen interest in drug development 
and clinical research led to my 
becoming a Patient Representative and 
Consultant in the FDA’s Cancer Drug 
Development Program. 
My education about 
clinical trials had begun.
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Accelerated Approval of Cancer 
Drugs
In September 2002, the Oncologic 
Drugs Advisory Committee 
recommended accelerated approval of 
AstraZeneca’s drug geﬁ  tinib (Iressa) 
based on a 10% tumor response 
rate in late-stage non-small-cell lung 
cancer [7–9], despite concurrent 
negative ﬁ  ndings in large randomized 
controlled trials [10,11]. It was a 
heated, emotional meeting, with many 
patients who otherwise would not have 
been alive offering personal testimony 
of beneﬁ  t from the drug. Obviously, 
some drug effect was present in this 
small minority of patients. Many others 
present however, were disturbed 
by the precedent set by the vote for 
approval, with the actual evidence 
showing tumor response in only 20 
patients in two small Phase II trials. 
Other people wondered why no target 
had been found for this “targeted” 
therapy to better predict response and 
nonresponse, as it had for trastuzumab 
(Herceptin) and hormonal therapies in 
breast cancer.
The FDA held an Oncologic Drugs 
Advisory Committee meeting the 
following spring, at which we reviewed 
seven cancer drugs for eight indications 
that had been granted accelerated 
approval, but had failed to complete 
the conﬁ  rmatory trials. Avoiding 
the problem that many drugs given 
accelerated approval had had enrolling 
individuals in their trials once the drug 
was on the market, AstraZeneca agreed 
to complete its conﬁ  rmatory trial of 
geﬁ  tinib overseas. But ultimately, 
geﬁ  tinib failed to show a beneﬁ  t in the 
large mandatory conﬁ  rmatory “Iressa 
survival evaluation in lung cancer” trial 
[12–15]. 
Meanwhile, independent researchers 
had managed to identify the epidermal 
growth factor receptor mutation that 
selects for most of the 10% of patients 
with lung cancer who respond to the 
drug [16–18]. Then in November 2004, 
Genentech’s competing epidermal 
growth factor receptor inhibitor, 
erlotinib (Tarceva), secured full FDA 
approval. In the face of the failed 
conﬁ  rmatory trial for geﬁ  tinib, FDA 
effectively removed the drug from the 
market, while allowing patients already 
responding to geﬁ  tinib to continue 
with their treatment. Among many 
other issues, the story of geﬁ  tinib in 
lung cancer illustrates the pressing 
need for concurrent development of 
biomarkers that select for treatment 
response to targeted therapies.
Early access to treatments and the 
impact on clinical trials is of course 
only one of the many important 
issues with clinical trials that could be 
addressed, but I’ve emphasized it here 
because it represents an arena that has 
engaged the patients and the public 
so consistently during my years as an 
advocate. 
Early Closure of Trials
Earlier this year, I spoke at the annual 
meeting of the American Society 
for Clinical Oncology on a related 
issue—the ethical and clinical dilemmas 
relating to the early closure of clinical 
trials in breast cancer (a recording of the 
talk, together with the slides I presented, 
is available at http:⁄⁄asco.org/
ac/1,1003,_12-002511-00_18-0034-00_
19-001290-00_21-001,00.asp). Such early 
closure has occurred with increasing 
frequency in recent years, notably in the 
P-1 breast cancer tamoxifen prevention 
trial [19], the MA-17 trial of letrozole 
(Femara) after tamoxifen [20], and 
most recently, the adjuvant trastuzumab 
(Herceptin) trials [21]. 
The issue of early trial closure is 
similar to that of accelerated approval 
of an experimental drug—in both 
cases, the balance of immediate needs 
for patients being treated today must 
be weighed against the knowledge 
gained that will advance evidence-
based medicine and help patients in 
the future. Patients facing treatment 
decisions in the future, after mature 
results of clinical trials have been 
published, clearly beneﬁ  t most from 
the completion of well-designed 
randomized trials with meaningful 
endpoints and long periods of follow-
up. Their needs are rarely served by 
stopping clinical trials early, or by 
trial designs that do not randomize 
trial participants, examine toxicity 
carefully, look at overall survival, or 
follow-up with patients to pick up any 
unanticipated late-term effects. 
Evidence-Based Patient Advocacy
It has been important for us as 
advocates to speak out on these issues 
in every available forum, as individuals 
and as organizations. Speaking out in 
this way educates the public as well as 
the medical and research communities. 
In my 2003 essay [1], I deﬁ  ned “access 
advocates” as those who see their role 
as arguing, as Abigail Alliance does, for 
earliest access, regardless of the affect 
on clinical research. 
When I wrote that 2003 essay, I 
wanted health professionals to know, 
as I want you to know today, that the 
perception of advocates clamoring for 
early access and compromising clinical 
trials is far from a complete picture. 
Many trained advocates are just as 
concerned as health professionals are 
with getting the very best evidence from 
clinical trials. We can help. Our stories 
have the power to move the public, to 
inﬂ  uence policy and legislation, and 
to help enroll patients in trials that 
they will want to be part of. I believe 
trained evidence-based advocates 
should have a seat and a voice at every 
table where clinical trials are designed 
and implemented. Together with 
scientists and clinicians, we can help 
health professionals to deﬁ  ne the most 
meaningful questions, and ensure 
that the design and conduct of trials 
are everything they should be. And we 
can help to educate the public about 
the need for well-designed, properly 
implemented clinical trials. 
As a writer, I understand the power 
of stories. Stories humanize policy, 
and offer the personal context in 
which policies and positions actually 
matter to people. Without our human 
stories to illustrate and elucidate cause 
and meaning, the positions health 
professionals take will not be very 
meaningful to the public and to the 
patients they hope to enroll in clinical 
trials. Properly told, stories have the 
power to move people, to change 
minds and hearts. Potentially, they have 
the power to reach a public who has 
little understanding of the research 
enterprise, and barely grasps the need 
Trained evidence-based 
advocates should have a 
seat and a voice at every 
table where clinical 
trials are designed and 
implemented.
Everyone requires 
evidence-based care.
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for clinical trials. Everyone is touched 
by illness. Everyone requires evidence-
based health care. I think we need to 
stop allowing the public dialogue on 
clinical research to be controlled by the 
drug companies and by mass media. 
We need to tell these important stories 
and express our strong convictions. 
My work as an advocate and my 
personal experience with NBCC tells 
me that policy positions are important, 
and that we can have an inﬂ  uence 
if we are willing to stand up for our 
principles. An organization, like an 
individual, is known by the positions 
it takes and the values it holds. 
Consistent, well-reasoned evidence-
based positions command respect, if 
not always agreement. So does steadfast 
refusal to take the expedient position, 
even when it may be more popular. 
These are the hallmarks of what can 
only be called integrity.  
This Essay was adapted from a talk delivered at 
the Annual Meeting of the Society for Clinical 
Trials, in Portland, Oregon, May 2005.
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